A Comparative Assessment of the German and American Economies Since World War II
by Siegfried H. Sutterlin, Ph.D.
Presented to the Society for German-American Studies, April 18, 2009
The Freiburg School of Ordoliberalism, which determined post-war West German economic policy, and Keynesianism, which determined U.S. post-war policy, originated in 1936. Keynes’ famous book, “The General Theory,” suggested that the solution to unemployment resides in government aggregate demand stimulation. If consumers refuse to spend during economic downturns, then the government should do it for them. Savings, for Keynes, was a form of avarice and greed. The chief opponent to Keynes, Friedrich Hayek, who later became associated with Ordoliberalism, warned Keynes that if the politicians embraced Keynes’ theory, they would cause inflation in the long run.
Almost simultaneously with the publication of Keynes’ famous book, Ludwig Erhard, who had written his Ph.D. dissertation under Franz Oppenheimer, published the roots of Ordoliberalism. Founded in Freiburg after WWII by Walter Eucken, Franz Boehm, Wilhelm Roepke, and Alfred Mueller-Armack, it set the stage for the social market economy, the “soziale Marktwirtschaft.” Eucken’s central thesis was to preserve liberty, to assure human dignity and maximize “Vermoegensbildung,” that is to say, asset accumulation and increasing the net worth of the people. Economic policy had to be rational, free of ideology, with a functional market economy, a neutral monetary policy and functional price mechanism. Unrestrained laissez-faire, for Eucken, in effect would not result in capitalism but in trusts, monopolies, and cartels. They would threaten freedom and efficient allocation of resources once prices no longer fulfilled their communicating and
rationing functions.
Rejecting both extreme socialism and unfettered capitalism, Ordoliberalism combines private enterprise with fair competition, low inflation, good working conditions and social welfare.
Decisive to post-war policies was Article 115, also known as “the Golden Rule,” of the ’49 “ Fundamental Law.” It states that budget deficits can only be incurred for investments such as infrastructure that enhance productivity. In the U.S. budget deficits are incurred for almost anything.
According to Mueller-Armack who coined the term “social market economy” in ‘46, the state would provide a regulatory policy for a competitive environment that would serve all people and not just one to five percent.
In sharp contrast to the Nazi period which centralized, imposed a four-year plan, dangerously suppressed inflation through the imposition of wage and price controls while excessively increasing the money supply and nationalized the “Reichsbank” in ‘38, post-war policies reversed all of this. Most decisive and crucial was the creation of the “Bundesbank” and its predecessor the Bank for German States. Under Blessing, Emminger, Poehl, and others, the central bank was the most independent and de-politicized central bank of any advanced economy. Its aim was to assure a stable currency which preserved purchasing power and fulfilled its function as a store of value so that the people could trust it.
This policy had several consequences: Savings was encouraged, consumption was de-emphasized. Inflation did not act as a work coercer forcing second breadwinners to enter the labor force or lengthening the work year to overcome inflation. Long-term planning on part of corporations, private and public entities was less disrupted and “Vermoegensbildung,” asset accumulation was encouraged.
In ‘49, the Federation of German Trade Unions was founded by Hans Bockler. Among its objectives were political neutrality and labor sharing with owners the management of industries. Bockler proposed the far-reaching “Mitbestimmung,” co-determination between owners and labor which was enacted in the early ‘50s. It was a consensus strategy which assured an almost strike-free beginning for West-Germany and an annual average of only 56 days lost in industry strikes between ‘67 to ‘76 in contrast to 1349 days lost in the U.S.
In the late sixties, Karl Schiller toyed with Keynesianism but ultimately retreated from it. Helmut Schmidt, in the seventies, did the same and also backed off. Neither outkeynesianized Keynes. In fact, Schmidt’s policy, in co-operation with the “Bundesbank’s“ tight monetary control, guided Germany far better than the U.S. through the devastating two oil crises of ’74 and ’79. In spite of having to import 98 percent of its oil, inflation rates for the two oil shock years were about half of the U.S. rate, even though the U.S. imported only 25 to 30 percent.
In fact, the Schmidt SPD administration used free market principles to overcome the oil shocks notably more successfully than the presumed capitalistic U.S. No major national plan, no rationing coupons, no allocation formulas, no price controls but only a few car-free Sundays were enacted. Gasoline prices were allowed to rise, while the contrary was the case in the U.S. where the Supreme Court in the early fifties approved ceilings on gas prices, a policy which inhibited the development of fuel efficient cars.
Consequently, oil supplies were diverted from the U.S. and other economies to chase after the rising prices in Germany. This had the effect of regional gas shortages in the U.S., while no major ones materialized in Germany. It was a crucial demonstration that the private sector of the socialistic German economy is in fact in major ways far more capitalistic than the private sector of the U.S. economy.
After ‘83, the German economy lost much of its momentum, and its GDP, though far from being an accurate measurement of economic well-being, fell noticeably behind the U.S. Labor rigidity, an overload of social welfare policies, high labor costs, among other elements were thought to be responsible. While some of this may be true, a closer look at the well-being of the German people reveals that they, in spite of a slower growing economy, still got wealthier while the same was not true to the same extent in the U.S. In fact, a seemingly contradictory development surfaced more and more, namely this, Germans worked less and less, having more and more vacation, and a lower GDP growth, yet they were still getting wealthier at a faster rate than Americans. Between ’94 to ’06, the full-time contractual workweek of a VW worker was 28.8 hours, probably the lowest workweek anywhere. Along with high labor cost, this obviously could not be sustained and
was recently changed.
During the unification, serious inefficiencies and some notable corruptions materialized along with a monumental irony. East Germany’s socialistic-communistic economy was dismantled, that is to say the public sector shrank, and the private sector was restored. Yet, to do so the public sector was expanded significantly in West Germany as is reflected in the annual 100 billion dollar subsidy granted to East Germany. To counteract this, the financing of much of the unification cost and the “Treuhandanstalt” was put off budget with time limits.
In the ’80s and ’90s, the German economy escaped an equivalent of the U.S. Savings and Loan catastrophe which cost the taxpayer 150 billions in ‘89 dollars (about 350 to 400 billion in current dollars.) Nor did the German economy have a four-year agricultural crisis of ’80 to ’84. Both were, in part, avoided due to the fact that German accounting procedures by law are required to value assets, not at current market prices, but at the original costs, hence providing banks and corporations with so-called “hidden reserves.” Had this been practiced in the U.S., the farm crisis would not have happened, and many other problems, including the subprime mess, would have been lessened in their severity.
German taxes after WWII were imposed by Allied governments at a terrifically high level to finance the occupation costs, a form of military expenditure, as well as reparations. Added to this was the 20-year long equalization of burden tax, the “Lastenausgleich.” Over the decades they were eased year after year. Professional economists of the Finance Ministry formulate tax policies and work out rational plans serving economic growth. Thereafter, they are submitted for approval to the parliament. Hence, German taxes are relatively immune from self-serving lobbying. In sharp contrast, the U.S. Tax Code, judged by many economists to be one the worst codes of all advanced economies, is the product not so much of a rational plan but more the sum-total of lobbying which tends to be inherently irrational.
In ‘68 a consumption tax, the value-added tax, was introduced, further restraining consumption and encouraging savings. It rose to 14 percent and currently is at 19 percent and provides the second highest revenues after the income tax. In sharp contrast, former House Ways and Means Chair Al Ullman attempted to introduce a value-added tax for the U.S. but was, in part, not re-elected for this reason in 1980.
Home purchases in Germany require heavy down payments, ranging between 20 to 40 percent while zero down payment and 100 percent financing are freely available in the U.S. In one of the sharpest and most meaningful contrasting tax policies, residential homes in Germany are not taxed, only the lot, the so-called “Grundsteuer,” while in the U.S. real estate taxes are anywhere from 8 to 25 times higher than in Germany and thus, no doubt, contribute to the slum-like conditions of many U.S. homes. Even though U.S. houses are subject to rapid deterioration, they are viewed as investments while economists in Germany view house purchases as consumption, again a crucial difference. Once a home is paid off, it can be passed on mortgage free to the next generation, hence storing and accumulating wealth in the time dimension and freeing spending for other purposes. In the U.S. nearly every generation assumes a mortgage, thus adding to an already overly
indebted economy.
During the roaring ’90s, the Germans escaped, relatively speaking, the stock market bubble with its associated corruption. Their savings continued at a high rate, and they poured their wealth into their homes, leisure time and more and more travels across the globe. Annual tourist spending of 73 billion almost matched total U.S. spending of 74 billion which means Germans spend roughly three times more than Americans.
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While the theoretical framework for the German social market economy was being formulated in ‘46, the Full Employment and Balanced Economic Growth Act was passed by the U.S. Congress. It institutionalized Keynesian aggregate demand management and empowered the federal government to assure full employment and stable economic growth. It was later affirmed and expanded in the ’78 Humphrey-Hawkins’ Act.
In ‘48 Paul Samuelson’s famous economics textbook popularized Keynesianism and advocated a constant increase of the money supply to generate an annual inflation rate of 1 to 2 percent for a constant stimulation of aggregate demand. Subsequent editions of his highly popular textbook increased the suggested annual inflation rate until the disastrously high inflation decade of the seventies.
Inflation became institutionalized, and it was forgotten that in a normal economy that has productivity increases, prices, if all other things remain equal, should be trending downward in the long run commensurate to productivity increases. In the fifties inflation was in the 1 to 2 percent range, in the sixties in the 2-4 percent range and it peaked in ’74 and ’79 at 11 to 12 percent, something of a record for peacetime.
Beyond this---and here is where outkeynesianizing Keynes is quantifiably proven---federal budget deficits to stimulate aggregate demand, according to Keynes should only be incurred during recessionary times. Yet, federal deficits occurred from the sixties on forward routinely during economic boom times. There were only 2 to 3 federal budget surpluses in the last forty odd years, thus giving incontestable proof that outkeynesianizing Keynes does indeed characterize the post-war U.S. economy, a policy essentially pursued by both parties.
The question arises why stimulate aggregate demand through outkeynesianizing Keynes over the decades. The answer resides in the fact that businesspeople and corporations, starting in ’46, eagerly embraced Keynesianism. Eventually, they lobbied to outkeynesianize Keynes. Having acquired a gargantuan tool to stimulate demand for their products, they equated maximizing the selling of their product with the health of the economy.
Having overdone the inflationary mechanism for stimulating aggregate demand by ‘79, the Fed and Paul Volcker received the message in October that if the Federal Reserve were to continue to inflate, the dollar would be dethroned as a reserve currency and a basket of currencies would be demanded for the purchase of oil. Combined with advice from monetarist economists like Milton Friedman, the Fed targeted the money supply instead of interest rates and reduced the inflation rate substantially at the heavy cost of the severe recession of ‘81-’82.
But this did not reduce the attempts of the producer to stimulate aggregate demand. Outkeynesianizing Keynes gradually transmogrified into more subtle patterns to satisfy the producer’s demand for selling products. Alan Greenspan, who headed the Federal Reserve between ’87 to ’06, discovered in the seventies that consumer demand could also be generated through home owners taking out home equity loans, cashing out capital gains on homes, or, for retirees, assuming reverse mortgages to sustain aggregate demand and consumption to satisfy the producer. Added to this pattern were massive debt assumptions through expanded use of credit cards and increasing purchases of homes, cars and other consumer items based on no down payment, no payments until six months or a year from the time of purchase. GMAC, founded in ‘19, and FMCC, founded in ‘23, constantly expanded through the post-war decades. A few years ago, Wal-Mart attempted to do the same
but was stopped.
This pattern of overstimulating aggregate demand and consumption was also reflected in bizarre advertisement and marketing techniques that targeted not just unqualified home buyers in the subprime mortgage sector but also showed up in media ads of car lots and furniture stores to catch those who have “bad credit or no credit, no problem, come see us.” (I have never seen an ad trying to solicit the responsible consumer.)
Economists heavily abetted overconsumption by vigorously praising the consumer for sustaining the health of the economy. The University of Michigan, more than 35 years ago, developed the Consumer Confidence Index to measure every month, not just every quarter, the degree to which the consumer is willing to spend money. Forgotten was the fact that a Savers’ Confidence Index would be far more beneficial for the people’s interest.
And thus, in the post-war period saving rates constantly trended downward in the U.S. and by ‘05 and ’06 actually went into dissavings for several years in a row, a meaningful symptom that had not happened to the U.S. economy since ‘32 in the depth of the Great Depression.
Essentially, it could be said that the U.S. economy, through outkeynesianizing Keynes, became an asset destroying economy wherein the interest of the people became excessively subordinated to the interest of the corporation and the producer.
On top of this, during the last 30 years or so, hedge funds, private equity firms and subprime mortgage corporations started or expanded explosively. A financialization of the U.S. economy was forged which dangerously neglected manufacturing. These new instruments, far less regulated, offered quick and outlandish profits and bonuses. While they evolved, analyzing the economy by professional economists such as Lester Thurow, John Kenneth Galbraith or Milton Friedman was supplanted by Wall Street brokers and salespeople of the financial industry.
Gradually, through TV programs such as Wall Street Week, the Nightly Business Report, Moneyline and new TV channels, the economy was analyzed from the perspective of stock markets. In effect, the well-being of Wall Street was equated with the health of the economy. A process that had started in the late forties when Merrill Lynch took Wall Street to main street came to a high point in 2000 when 54 percent of all Americans owned stock, up from 25 percent in ‘90. Comparable figures for the German economy show a far lower range of 6 to 12 percent. Wall Street became too big to fail just like megabanks became too big to fail.
Since WWII, Wall Street was forging nationally the most intensely collectivizing investment stream of any advanced economy, and it was doing so by urging investors to diversify. But diversification in a collectivized investment stream, while it has a logic and also subtly serves to protect the brokers, is neglecting the important fact that true diversification of investment resides in local and regional investments which tend to spread wealth more uniformly across the nation, as the German economy quite clearly proves in the high level of regional living standards.
Collectivizing investments into Wall Street maximizes fees, involves vast geographical distances, minimizes transparency, operates in an asymmetric knowledge market that always favors the insiders, the sophisticated investors, and maximizes opportunities for corruption. German emphasis on local and regional investments minimizes these negative elements. Re-injecting the money back into the economy aggravates the already intensely collectivized private sector of the U.S. economy in the form of chain fast food outlets, chain restaurants, chain hotels, chain stores in sharp contrast to the German economy which still maintains highly attractive family owned restaurants and family owned hotels. It is not surprising that Wal-Mart has become, in the last 20 years, the largest corporation. It tried to export its disease to Germany but was rebuffed.
It must be understood that in sharp contrast to popular myths, the private sector of the U.S. economy is, in fact, intensely collectivistic/socialistic. A parasitic cost shifting pulsates intensely throughout the U.S. economy far more than in Germany. It is exemplified in the broadcasting industry and even in free restrooms. Rush Limbaugh’s 50 million annual income causes the products of his corporate sponsors to rise and the cost to be passed on to those not in the market, those who receive no benefit, who had no choice and who have no transparency.
l. Risk transfer and risk dispersion characterize the U.S. economy. It surfaced in the S and L crisis, in the stock market bubble and the current subprime mess. Risks are transferred and dispersed through insurance premiums, through monetary policy, and also onto the taxpayer.
2. The constantly declining dollar did not solve the trade deficits for the U.S. v. the constantly rising Mark and Euro did not reduce German trade surpluses.
3. Military spending, a major taboo, is thought to have collapsed the Soviet Union. Yet, few if any admit that it has done and is doing the same to the U.S. Just to withdraw from Iraq is estimated to cost 1 trillion dollars.
3. The computer revolution and the hi-tech internet revolution were both started in the U.S., yet were largely misapplied.
4. Wealth has constantly shifted from family/individual control to bureaucratic control in the U.S. v. Germany.
5. Catastrophic increases in people living in marginal trailerhomes characterize the U.S. In the ‘60 census of 180 mill. people 1.4 million lived in trailerhomes by the ‘90 census of 240 mill. more than 15 mill. did so. Almost no one lives in a trailer home in Germany.
6. An oasis economy has developed in the U.S. in the form of gated and securitized communities which rose from 2000 in ’50 census to 20,000 in 2000. The wealthy who retreat to them in effect vote no confidence in the overall economic development.
7. Massive wealth shifting from foreign economies to the U.S. through Seigniorage, (above 400 bill.), through subprime investments, and possibly outright theft---Carlyle Group.
8. Medical costs are 16 percent of GDP in the U.S. v. 10.5 percent in Germany, yet life expectancy is one year higher in Germany.
9. Corrective measures too often come from external sources----car industry, inflationary seventies, education, etc.
10. Comparative actions and policies of U.S. v. German bureaucracies.
To summarize: about two years ago the U.S. economy had a massive trade deficit of c. 870 billion while the German economy had a 280 billion dollar trade surplus in spite of a constantly rising currency. The U.S. was developing a subprime and mortgage bubble while Germany had none. Beyond this, the German federal budget had a surplus of 1 percent of GDP while the U.S. had a 3.5 percent deficit. Dissavings prevailed in the U.S. while the savings rate was still high in Germany. Unemployment, which had been far higher in Germany for many years, was actually declining while it was rising in the U.S.
And so what did the immigrants leave and what did they find. They left an economy which has done far more with far fewer resources while working less and less and found an economy which has done far less with far more resources while working more and more. Those 580,000 who left in the fifties had their net worth decline commensurate to the constantly falling dollar relative to the German currency and the Euro by c. 70 percent. Yet, those who came to retire in the U.S. in the last few decades benefited in similar ways in which American retirees benefit from living in Mexico.